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Stockholder Attacks on Voluntary Group
Pension Plans
A pension plan is a program adopted to provide for the livelihood of
employees or their beneficiaries through payment of benefits without re-
gard to profits.' Benefits may be realized upon the retirement, disability,
or death of the employee. Such a plan may be voluntarily adopted by
an employer, or it may be the product of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.' Plan benefits are usually composed of two elements: (1) past
service benefits based on length of service with the company prior to
adoption of the plan; and (2) future service benefits based on service
with the company between the date of adoption of the plan and the em-
ployee's retirement date.3
It is generally accepted that current economic and social demands
place a moral duty upon employers to furnish a system and means for
providing old age benefits.4 This duty is often fulfilled by the adoption
of a pension plan. In this way pension plans operate to benefit society
as a whole. But there are also corporate benefits. Pension plans oper-
ate to retire superannuated employees. This means actual savings in pay-
roll, since an older employee's pension will not cost the company nearly
as much as allowing him to continue working at a high hourly wage.'
Employee morale also will be improved because retirement of superan-
nuated employees will clear the ranks for promotion.6 Finally, public
relations will be improved because a pension plan adds to the prestige
of the employer in the community and attracts desirable employees.7
Recognizing the meritorious social purpose of pension plans, Congress
has afforded them special tax treatment.8 If a plan qualifies under sec-
tion 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the employee's bene-
fits are not taxable to him until the payments are distributed or made
available.' Since the distribution usually is not made until after retire-
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (a) (2) (i) (1956).
2. Note, Consideration For The Employer's Promise Of A Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U.
CHI. L. REV. 96 (1955).
3. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 644
(3d ed. 1962).
4. See, e.g., Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 At. 80 (1925).
5. O'Neal, Stockholder Attacks on Corporate Pension Systems, 2 VAND. L. REv. 351 (1949).
6. Ibid.
7. Dix, Retirement Allowance And Pension Plans, 31 GEO. L.J. 22 (1942).
8. Full consideration of pension plan tax advantages is not within the scope of this note.
For detailed discussion see CAvrrCH, OHIO CORPORATION LAW, § 5.2 (1963).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (1) [hereinafter cited as CODE §].
Stockholder Attacks on Pension Plans
ment, the employee will be in a lower tax bracket. Capital gains treat-
ment is permitted when total distributions payable to a particular em-
ployee are paid to him within one taxable year."0 Again, if the plan
qualifies, the company may deduct its contributions thereto subject to
certain limitations."1 Finally, if a qualified trust is utilized as a funding
medium, the trust income will be tax exempt.'2 Thus, the employer will
not be required to contribute such a large amount to fund the trust.
Corporate authority to establish pension plans is generally recog-
nized.'" Minority stockholders, however, have argued that such plans
are ultra vires in that they require expenditures for a purpose not ex-
pressed in the articles of incorporation and thus waste corporate funds. 4
This argument loses force when one realizes the corporate advantages of
having a pension system. But because pensions are a proper subject of
collective bargaining, 5 a lack of authority to adopt a pension plan could
place the employer in a quandary. As a result, many states have expressly
granted such authority by statute.'"
Minority stockholders, however, continue to attack such plans. These
attacks may be based upon arguments of past or inadequate considera-
tion, either of which is said to amount to a waste of corporate assets.'
This note will consider the validity of these attacks on voluntary group
pension plans.' " Past service and future service benefits will be discussed
separately.
PAST SERVICE BENEFITS
An important issue concerning pension plans arises when they are
adopted after some employees have ceased working, or are adopted short-
ly before other employees have reached retirement age. In these circum-
stances, the services still to be rendered are not worth the benefit pro-
posed to be paid.'" Minority stockholders thus may object on the ground
that no consideration flows to the corporation from the employees and
the corporation is therefore tendering a gift for past services.20
10. CODE 5 402(a) (2).
11. CODE 5 404(a).
12. CODE § 501(a).
13. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTScHILD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 641; O'Neal, supra note 5.
14. O'Neal, supra note 5.
15. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1948).
16. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-04(16) (1960); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 202(a) (13);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.030(16) (1961); TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN., art. 2.02(17)
(1956).
17. LATrIN, CORPORATrONS 239 (1959).
18. A group pension plan is one which covers more than one or two employees.
19. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHIaD, op. cit. supra note 3.
20. O'Neal, supra note 5.
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Several authorities are often relied upon by minority stockholders to
support their objection." One such precedent is the case of Beers v. New
York Life Ins. Co.,22 in which the president of the defendant company
resigned. The board of trustees authorized a pension of $37,500, equal
to one-half of his annual salary. Payment was not forthcoming, and
plaintiff sued. Although he had promised to serve in an advisory capac-
ity and not to compete with the company, the court found that the true
consideration for the contract was past services. The board of trustees
could not compensate for these services.
The case of Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.25 involved the
Railroad Retirement Act, 24 which gave a statutory right to a pension to
carrier employees. Benefits were based in part on past service. The
United States Supreme Court held the act unconstitutional on two
grounds: first, Congress had gone beyond the scope of the commerce
clause; and second, the imposition of liability for services already ren-
dered and compensated deprived the railroad company of property with-
out due process of law.
In Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co.,2" the plaintiff, a former employee of
the defendant company, brought an action for payments allegedly due
under the company's pension plan. The plan had been adopted after
the plaintiff was well over retirement age and only one year before he
applied for a pension. The court held that since the plan had been
adopted at a time when the plaintiff was past retirement age, his services
could not have constituted a valid consideration for a pension.
In certain circumstances, the rule that past services do not constitute
valid consideration for a pension has not been applied. Thus, where
there has been an implied understanding between a company and an em-
ployee that the latter would receive additional compensation if the com-
pany prospered, the courts have found an implied contract binding the
company.26 Also, where an employee who is about to retire when the
plan is adopted agrees to render future services, such as, working for a
longer period of time,27 leasing property at a reduced rental,28 or remain-
21. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Dolan v. Heller Bros.
Co., 30 N.J. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1954); Beers v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 20 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
22. 20 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
23. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
24. 48 Stat. 1283 (1954).
25. 30 N.J. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1954).
26. Wineburgh v. Seeman, 21 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Holmes v. Republic Steel
Corp., 84 Ohio App. 442, 84 N.E.2d 508 (1948).
27. Ulman v. Sunset- McKee Co., 221 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1955).
28. Markson v. Markson's Furniture Stores, Inc., 267 N.Y. 137, 195 N.E. 824 (1935).
[Vol. 15:554
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ing loyal and not engaging in competitive employment,29 such services
have been held to constitute sufficient consideration for a pension. But
the Beers case30 remains as a warning that a court may find the future
services to be rendered inadequate.
The Beers, Alton, and Dolan cases, however, do not appear to be
sufficient authority to overcome the inference of payment of considera-
tion for past services.3" The Beers case involved a pension for a single
executive. When a pension for an executive is provided under an indi-
vidual, rather than a group plan, the policy reasons favoring group pen-.
sion plans are absent. Thus a court will subject an individual plan to
closer investigation to determine the adequacy of future services or
whether the plan in reality is based on past services.32 Although the
Dolan.case involved a group plan, the suit was brought by one employee,
not to attack the plan, but to recover benefits under it."3 While under
such circumstances a court might hold that an agreement to pay a past
service pension is not binding on a corporation for lack of consideration,
it, nevertheless, still might be willing to recognize that the corporation
has authority to pay past service pensions in view of the future benefits it
will receive. 4  Furthermore, the Beers and Dolan decisions may have
been influenced by extrajudicial circumstances.3 5
The Alton case is also not in point. The Railroad Retirement Act
was violative of the due process clause of the United States Constitution
in that it imposed a compulsory pension system upon the companies.
When a plan is voluntarily adopted by a company there is obviously no
federal or state compulsion. Therefore, no constitutional issue arises,
and the question of whether past services constitute consideration is a
matter of state law and is subject to local policy. 6 Moreover, the argu-
29. Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Ad. 571 (1932), rev'd on
other grounds, 318 Pa. 490, 178 At. 490 (1935).
30. 20 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
31. " This court is not persuaded that the Beers case, handed down by a New York court in
1892, is any safe guide to present day law in relation to corporate pension plans." Good v.
Modern Globe, Inc., 346 Mich. 602, 609, 78 N.W.2d 199, 203 (1956); "The result is un-
fortunate and to be deplored, but courts of original jurisdiction are necessarily constrained to
follow the generally established rules of law." Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co., 30 NJ. Super.
440, 445, 104 A.2d 860, 862 (Super. Cr., Ch. Div. 1954).
32. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHScHILD, op. cit. siepra note 3, at 645.
33. For consideration of employees' rights under pension plans see Note, Contractual Aspects
Of Pension Plan Mfodification, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 251 (1956); Note, Legal Status of Private
Industrial Pension Plans, 53 HARv. L. R1IV. 1375 (1939).
34. O:Neal, supra note 5.
35. Life insurance scandals at the turn of the century possibly influenced the Beers decision.
2 WASHGrON & ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 645. The Dolan decision could
have been influenced by evidence introduced to prove that. Dolan, rather than working for
the company, was working for its president in a personal capacity.
36. Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co., 354 Pa. 57, 46 A.2d 208 (1946).
1964]
558 WBSTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:554
ment may be made that the Court in Alton should have limited itself to
the validity of the act under the commerce clause.
Several decisions indicate that past services may constitute valid con-
sideration for a pension.37 In Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co.,3"
minority stockholders sought to enjoin the implementation of a group
pension plan. The plan provided benefits calculated upon employees'
past tenure and was, therefore, said to be an illegal payment of compen-
sation for past services. A state statute provided:
Every business corporation may grant allowances or pensions out of
the earnings of the corporation to its directors, officers, or employees,
for faithful and long-continued service, who have, in such service, be-
come old, infirm, or disabled.39
The court held that the legislature intended to allow a corporation to
grant pensions to those who have become old, infirm, or disabled, pen-
sions which reflect long-continued service in the past.
In Teich v. National Castings Co.,4" a plan was amended to provide
an increase in benefits for participants already retired as well as those still
employed. Plaintiff, a stockholder, contended that the amendment re-
sulted in an unreasonable gift of corporate funds without reasonable or
adequate consideration. The ex-president's pension was heavily attacked.
The court stated that the corporation had received adequate consideration
for the increase in the form of varied tangible and intangible benefits
from service to the corporation, both before and after the ex-president's
retirement.
These decisions represent the modern and better view. And while it
may be argued that the holding in the Osborne case was based on a
statute, the court also recognized that a pension plan which does not take
into account past service would not furnish an adequate retirement allow-
ance. This is especially true for older employees who are most in need
of pensions, and, obviously, a company has a definite interest in seeing
that its plan does not discriminate against older employees. Thus, even
in the absence of the favoring statute, the decision probably would have
been the same.
Courts should take a stronger position on this issue. When determin-
ing whether a group pension plan is supported by adequate consideration,
the plan must be viewed as a contract between an employer and a group
of employees, many of whom are hired in the future. The consideration
for such a plan flows from the group to the company in the form of im-
37. Teich v. National Castings Co., 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Osborne v.
United Gas Impprovement Co., 354 Pa. 57, 46 A.2d 208 (1946).
38. 354 Pa. 57, 46 A.2d 208 (1946).
39. Id. at 63, 46 A.2d at 211, citing, 15 P.S. § 2852-316. The present statute is substantially
the same: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-316 (1958).
40. 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
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proved employee morale and better public relations. The fact that one
or two individuals are about to retire and will receive pensions does not
mean that consideration for the plan is not present. Past service is not
the consideration. It is simply a fair method for computing benefits un-
der the plan.41
There are additional arguments supporting a pension based on past
service. In England, where the practice of granting pensions prevailed
long before it was accepted in this country,42 courts have been more
liberal in recognizing pensions based on past services.48 Also, in the
United States, municipal corporations have been permitted to grant past
service pensions regardless of constitutional limitations on gifts of public
funds.44 Even many government pensions take past service into account."
Thus, it may be said that the rules regarding past service pensions should
and will be relaxed in the future.48
FuTuRE SERVICE BENEFITS
Pension plans in which benefits are based on future service are not
as legally objectionable as past service plans. It is well established that
a corporation, acting through its board of directors, may hire officers and
employees for a reasonable compensation." This compensation need
not be paid at once if the employee or officer chooses to receive it at a
later time.48 Thus, future service pension benefits are considered deferred
compensation,4" validating pension plans which take effect at the time
employees commence employment." The amount of the pension bene-
fit, however, must be reasonably related to the extent of the future ser-
vices to be rendered.51 Overpayment would amount to waste or spolia-
tion of corporate assets.
A benefit must be reasonably related to the future services to be ren-
dered. This point has caused some difficulty in a few cases. In Nemser
v. Aviation Corp.," minority stockholders sought to enjoin the adoption
41. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (Hughes, CJ., dis-
seating).
42. O'Neal, supra note 5.
43. E.g., Cyclist's Touring Club v. Hopkinson, [1910] 1 Ch. 179; Henderson v. Bank of
Australasia, 4 T.LL 734 (1888).
44. E.g., Haldeman v. Hillegans, 335 Pa. 375, 6 A.2d 801 (1939).
45. 2 WAstINGroN & RomscHrLD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 654.
46. Ibid.
47. 2 WASHNGOrON & ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 642.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. E.g., Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948); Cohn v. Colum-
bia Pictures Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
51. Ibid.
52. 47 F. Supp. 515 (D. Del. 1942).
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of a pension plan for only those employees earning over $4200 per year.
Participants in the plan were to contribute during the remainder of their
service with the corporation on the basis of salary. When a participant
attained age sixty-five, the corporation was to contribute whatever addi-
tional amount was necessary to purchase an annuity contract for that par-
ticipant. The objections were that (1) the plan was a waste of corporate
assets in that benefits bore no relation to the extent of the services to be
rendered, and (2) the plan was inequitable because it was limited to
officers and employees receiving a higher bracket of income. In support
of their first contention, the minority stockholders presented the follow-
ing illustration. Employee A, forty-four years of age, began twenty-six
years ago as an office-boy. He now earns $50,000 per year and would
be entitled to a pension of $14,250. The corporation would be required
to contribute about $99,000 for his annuity. Employee B, fifty-four years
of age, began one year ago. He also makes the same amount as Employee
A and would be entitled to the same pension. However, the corporation
would be required to contribute about $155,000 for his pension, because
he will work ten years less than Employee A and, therefore, will not
personally contribute as much.
The court encountered no difficulty in answering the second conten-
tion. By limiting plan participants to employees earning over $4200, the
corporation extended to higher paid employees the policy and protection
of the federal social security laws. The first contention, however, seemed
to present a dilemma. While recognizing that the benefit must bear
some relation to the value of the services; the court simply held that "cer-
tain inequities are bound to arise in such a plan."53
Additional'reasons may be urged in support of this decision. First,
to evaluate the proficiency of each individual employee would have been
time consuming and costly for the corporation. These problems were
circumvented by basing benefits on salary, and this procedure is in accord
with sound business practice. Second, discrimination in benefits among
employees earning the same salary would have lowered employee morale
and thus defeated one of the principal benefits of the plan for the corpo-
ration. Finally, the illustration utilized to support the first contention,
although accurate, does not represent the normal situation. The greater
number of corporate employees would earn much less than $50,000.
Therefore, the corporation would not be required to contribute excessive
additional amounts for these employees.
The issue of whether a pension benefit is reasonable, however, arises
most often when highly compensated executives and officers are included
in a plan. Inclusion of such persons is fast becoming standard procedure,
since pension plans represent a device to keep executives and officers con-
53. Id. at 518.
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tented with their present positions." But neither action by disinterested
directors nor ratification by majority stockholders can justify payments
which amount to a waste of corporate assets."5
The problem is well illustrated in Folgelson v. American Woolen
Co.,"6 where two stockholders sought to enjoin the company from imple-
menting a retirement plan for salaried employees. The plan used a per-
centage formula which gave consideration to both salary and length of
service. The company also proposed to pay the entire past service liabil-
ity into a trust in one lump sum. The president's salary had been
$100,000 for a number of years prior to the proposed adoption date of
the plan. One year prior to this date his salary was increased by $50,000.
This increase caused his potential benefit to be $54,000. The plaintiffs
contended that the lump sum past service payment, the failure to set a
maximum pension, and the amount of the president's pension all resulted
in a waste of corporate assets.
The court refused to interfere with the business judgment of the di-
rectors in paying the past service liability in a lump sum and declining to
set a maximum pension. There had been no clear abuse of discretion
amounting to legal waste. The court held, however, that the reasonable-
ness of the president's pension presented a triable issue of fact.57 If the
amount of the pension was to be justified, it had to be in the employer's
interest-to assure those with high salaries that they would retire on a pen-
sion computed upon the same formula as low salaried employees. The
court also stated that whether the company could obtain an able execu-
tive upon the president's retirement without promising him a pension of
$54,000 was relevant to the issue of reasonableness.
Several other factors also bear weight in determining the reasonable-
ness of an executive's pension. In the Fogelson case, the plan had re-
ceived a favorable ruling from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.58
To acquire such a ruling, a pension plan must be one that does not "dis-
criminate in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, persons
whose principal duties consist of supervising the work of other employees,
or highly compensated. employees."59  The Commissioner's opinion that
a plan does not so discriminate suppofts the contention that the amount
of a pension is reasonable.00 Furthermore, a majority of stockholders
54. LATrnN, CORPORATIONS 239 (1959).
55. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
56. 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948).
57. The case was not retried. A settlement was entered into whereby the president was to
receive a pension of approximately one half of the original amount.
58. Such a ruling permits the company to deduct the amount of its contributions to the
plan from the income tax and exempts the income of the trust fund from taxation.
59. CoDE 5 401(a) (4).
60. Moore v. Keystone Macarom Mfg. Co., 370 Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952).,
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